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Much is known about the acquisition of phonological competence and lexical
categories, but there has been substantially less research into word meaning
development. In an attempt to contribute to this debate, a group of 24 children aged
4–11 were asked to define a set of words, as were a group of 12 adult controls. The
stimuli included both concrete and abstract words, in particular words exhibiting a rare
form of polysemy known as copredication, which permits the simultaneous attribution
of concrete and abstract senses to a single nominal, creating an ‘impossible’ entity.
The results were used to track the developmental trajectory of copredication, previously
unexplored in the language acquisition literature.
Keywords: copredication, polysemy, paradoxes, semantics, iconicity
INTRODUCTION
There are many aspects we can consider when it comes to the question of how children acquire
language, with perhaps the most mysterious being the origin of meaning. Hinzen points out in
that ‘[t]heories of semantics are about a domain in nature that we do not understand’ (Hinzen,
2011: 419), adding elsewhere that a primary reason is because ‘we haven’t got sense organs for
[meanings]’ in the way we do for sounds (2006: ix). Indeed, because of our cognitive ‘scope and
limits’ (Russell, 1948), study of human conceptual systems ‘may well fall beyond human naturalistic
inquiry in crucial respects’ (Chomsky, 2000: 125). As Hinzen points out in his Essay on Names and
Truth:
Our minds have managed an analysis of the generative principle of number – an easy case – but they
fail badly in the analysis of house, which is already much too complex, apparently, and maybe there is
not much hope that we will ever succeed for something like justice.
Putting this disparity down to ‘principled cognitive limitations,’ he adds that ‘[t]here are reasons
for pessimism in this domain. . . which there may not be in the domain of the mathematical
sciences, whose central concepts and modes of understanding are easier’ (Hinzen, 2007: 160–1).
Proceeding with the assumption that a naturalistic theory of semantics is possibly beyond our
intellectual reach, we can nevertheless inquire through the behavior of children to what extent
their semantic and conceptual knowledge appears to have developed. Numerous hypotheses have
emerged from centuries of a priori and empirical study, such as empiricism, whose adherents claim
that semantics originates purely from the data of sense, with a traditional empiricist contention
being that ‘the syntactic structure of languages (like everything else) is learned from sensory
input’ (Scholz and Pullum, 2006). An opposing set of hypotheses, collected under the banner of
nativism, adopts the assumption that experience serves to trigger, and not to form, the meaning
of lexical items; assumptions dating back to Plato and Leibniz. Nativists hold that the ability to
learn grammar and lexical meaning is hard-wired into the brain and that all human languages
share certain structural properties. Indeed, ‘analytic mechanisms of the language faculty seem to
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be triggered in much the same ways whether the input is auditory,
visual, even tactual, and seem to be localized in the same brain
areas, somewhat surprisingly’ (Chomsky, 2000: 122). Chomsky
has consequently urged that we reverse Aristotle’s dictum that
‘language is sound with meaning’ to ‘language is meaning with
sound’ (Chomsky, 2011), with Hinzen (2006) qualifying that,
being primarily a thought-system, we should view externalization
as a secondary function of language, and ‘communication’ as
tertiary, being an even smaller component of language use.
To demonstrate more clearly the governing argument of the
nativists, we can take the case of Helen Keller, who became
death blind after the age of 19 months. She recalls learning the
meaning of the word water when her teacher placed one of
her hands under a water pump and spelled out the word’s five
letters with the other: ‘Suddenly I felt a misty consciousness as
of something forgotten. . . I knew then that “w-a-t-e-r” meant
the wonderful cool something that was flowing over my hand’
(Keller, 1902/1954: 56). Keller consequently managed to associate
a particular concept with the word water. In this case, she
associated an innate, functional concept to the five letters spelling
water, defining it not so much through its physical features but
rather through its contextual use – something that children and
other adults readily do, as the current study will show.
While the acquisition of single words has received much
attention (Bloom, 2000; McMurray et al., 2012), the development
of more abstract lexical senses – such as abstract and
concrete – which can be represented through multiple words, has
received less attention. More generally, semantic acquisition and
development relate to more universal cognitive capacities, such
as the ability to conceptualize movement, activities, instruments,
locations, recipients, and so forth. By the age of 5 months
infants can detect language-relevant data from the environment
before selectively responding to certain words, including their
own names (Vihman, 1988). After producing their first words
at around 10–15 months (Fenson et al., 1994), joint attention
appears to be crucial for semantic development, with the infant’s
hypothesis that words refer to ‘things’ struggling to maintain
coherence when, for instance, an adult says look instead of cat
when pointing to their pet. The first ‘iconic’ stage of lexical
development lasts from around ages 1–3 (Özçalıs¸kan et al.,
2014), when children are unable to learn abstract words and
when they correspondingly realize that objects have names (what
we could call the ‘Helen Keller moment’). Before they reach
maturity, children assume that words refer to whole objects
and not their parts (the ‘whole object assumption’), with the
principle of mutual exclusivity dictating that every object can
only have one name (Markman, 1994). Infants consequently
appear to develop innate perceptual and cognitive strategies for
acquiring the meaning of words – an assumption already made in
Bruner (1957) and which has been standardly used to support the
‘modularity thesis’ (Fodor, 1983; Gunnar and Maratsos, 1991);
the division of sensory objects into ontological categories (e.g.,
SUBSTANCE and INDIVIDUAL, which help form a child’s intuitive
materials-science) is one such well-documented capacity (Soja
et al., 1991). In addition, Hespos and Spelke (2004) review
experiments which show that, as in speech perception, children
do not learn the meanings of words but which distinctions
of meaning the language they are exposed to makes, allowing
5-month-old Korean speakers to be sensitive to distinctions
marked in their native language but not English. They conclude
that ‘the early development of semantic categories parallels
the development of phonological categories’ and suggest that
semantics ‘evolved to capitalize on pre-existing representational
capacities.’ What these pre-existing conceptual capacities are
remains largely unknown, with the problem being made no easier
by Bloom’s conclusion to How Children Learn the Meanings of
Words: ‘Nobody knows how children learn the meaning of words’
(Bloom, 2000: 262). All in all, there are reasons to conclude
that the development of word meanings relies heavily on non-
linguistic conceptual structures.
These ideas are consistent, for instance, with the findings in
Gershkoff-Stowe (2002), who showed across two experiments
that words which were practiced via production more often
than others became more resilient to lexical interference from
competing words (in children aged 14.3–17.2 months), and
that older children, being more experienced in this process,
exhibited proportionally fewer production errors (in children
aged 27–30 months). Across all age groups, the source of
these productions errors was similar, leading Gershkoff-Stowe to
propose the existence of common processing mechanisms used
in lexical acquisition. Gershkoff-Stowe (2002: 684) concludes that
these results ‘suggest that questions concerning what children
know about categories of objects and how they learn the
names for things cannot be separated from questions about
memory retrieval processes and how conceptual representations
are modified with use.’ It appears that these domain-general
retrieval processes are heavily involved in language-specific
lexical processes of acquisition, much as how non-linguistic
conceptual structures contribute to word meaning development.
In what follows, I will review an experiment into the various
stages of lexical and metalinguistic proficiency [as Hoff-Ginberg
puts it, through elementary school years ‘the internal structure of
children’s lexicons changes and becomes more adultlike’ (Hoff-
Ginsberg, 1997: 125)]. I will assume that only part of the concept
river develops before the word is learnt [perhaps its internal
geometry, ‘conceptualized as an unbounded line... fattened out
by a bounded line... resulting in a surface’ (Pinker, 2008: 180)]
in line with the experimental evidence reviewed above; then, with
the help of lexicalisation, further complexity is added. This was
referred to by Cromer (1974) as ‘the cognition hypothesis,’ a title
much too mild today considering the overwhelming evidence.
The questions which will concern us most center around the
development of metalinguistic awareness in a small sample
of children, who range from the ages of 4–11, and how the
definitions they give of polysemous lexical items differ.
Unlike much previous work (e.g., Carey, 1978; Soja et al., 1985;
Dickinson, 1988), the present set of interviews and analysis do
not focus on how children reduce the hypothesis space of a given
word’s meaning, since the nature of complex polysemous words
does not seem to be tightly constrained by any narrow set of
modulated variables in the way that, for instance, the mass/count
distinction has often been used to gauge the development of
material words, or in the way that the proper/common noun
distinction has been used to test the interpretation of unfamiliar
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objects by 2-years-old (Gelman and Taylor, 1984). No such
clear manipulations are available for complex polysemy. Instead,
children’s responses to probing questions about the nature and
range of polysemous terms were used to track the approximate
developmental trajectory of simultaneously conjoining abstract
and concrete senses to yield novel forms of polysemy.
The present study focuses on a particular form of complex
polysemy, copredication, and all of the eight nominals which the
participants were asked to discuss were capable of copredication.
These were: river, word, person, city, book, water, house,
ship. Copredication is standardly defined as ‘a grammatical
construction in which two predicates jointly apply to the
same argument’ (Asher, 2011: 11). In He paid the bill and
threw it away, the nominal within the Determiner Phrase (bill)
takes multiple semantically unrelated predicates, yielding an
‘impossible’ set of semantic relations which could not have a
corresponding physical referent. Companies can be demolished
but also criticized, cities can be sunny, upland and liberal,
bills can be paid and folded, and newspapers can be read,
held, sued, located outside the city and unable to offer John
a job. Mixing an abstraction with the concrete appears to be
part of the productive nature of lexical semantics, but the
developmental properties of these phenomena are unknown.
One of the core diagnostics for copredication is anaphora of
the kind found in the bill example, where the pronoun triggers
a distinct sense of the nominal (Asher, 2011). Polysemous
words are single phonological forms coding multiple semantically
related meanings (e.g., run, key). This is in contradistinction
to homophones, which are single phonological forms coding
multiple semantically unrelated senses, e.g., pupil. Copredication,
in contrast, involves the attribution of semantically unrelated
senses to a single (and not multiple) polysemous word to derive
its meaning, such as in book (whose informational content
can be read and whose physical features can be touched)
and lunch (which can last for a given duration whilst also
bearing particular flavors, again yielding clear semantic type-
theoretic contradictions). Basic polysemous nominals do not
permit copredication (e.g., #James Joyce is on the top shelf
and he’s had a haircut, which does not permit simultaneous
reference to an individual and his creative works), and only a
small number of nominals allow it – typically, book-type, lunch-
type and city-type. This can often lead to certain paradoxes,
explored in the present study: For instance, since book can host
semantically distinct senses, this can lead to a situation in which
John read and burned every book in the library can result in
different numbers of books being read and burned, since a library
can contain multiple physical copies of a single informational
book.
Even though the developmental properties of copredication
are unknown and it is possible only in a relatively limited
range of nominals, the basic operations of semantic conjunction
(Gotham, 2015) are all that is needed to generate it. Concerning
simultaneously abstract and concrete objects, Elbourne (2011: 26)
comments: ‘We still have to explain how it is that we can say
something apparently straightforward and true, like [abstract
and concrete books], but using self-contradictory concepts. I
am not aware of any work on this.’ A number of researchers
(Asher, 2011, 2015; Jezek and Vieu, 2014; Gotham, 2015) have
since cleared the ground for a formal account of certain aspects
of copredication, typically focusing on numeric quantification
and telicity – but much terrain is yet to be covered, such as
the processing properties of copredication (see Murphy, 2017
for initial directions) and, as addressed here, its developmental
properties.
While they do not address copredication, Srinivasan and
Snedeker’s (2011) study of the representation of polysemous and
homophonous meanings in 4-year-old children is perhaps the
closest in the literature to the present experiment. They raise
the possibility that the generative operations or lexical properties
which yield polysemy might support children’s representations
of polysemy. They show that 4-years-old can understand both
the concrete and abstract meaning of book, and therefore argue
that polysemous senses rely on a common representational
base from early in development. Polysymous senses are either
stored independently in the lexicon (termed the List Model by
Srinivasan and Snedeker) or share a common representational
base (the Generative Model, or One Representation Hypothesis).
They taught a group of 4-years-old a novel label (such as blicket)
that corresponded to a single known meaning of a polysemous
word (such as the information sense of book). Their results
suggested that children can readily comprehend extended uses
of these novel labels to another sense of the same polysemous
word, suggesting that the senses share the same lexical entry,
or representational base (see Srinivasan and Snedeker, 2011 for
further details). They concluded that polysemous words seem to
be acquired not by relating two distinct senses, but rather through
‘foundational properties of the mental lexicon or conceptual
system’ (2011: 250). This would also support the finding that
polysemous words are recognized faster than homonyms or
monosemes due to their richer semantic representations (Rodd
et al., 2002).
Philosophers typically argue that ‘concrete’ things exist
contingently (such that an individual table or pencil could
exist at one moment and cease to exist at another), whereas
‘abstract’ things exist necessarily (e.g., Moltmann, 2013), without
acknowledging that both things can exist side by side in cases
such as The book was funny but weighed a ton. Meanwhile,
developmental psychologists have argued that concrete and
abstract meanings emerge at distinct maturational stages
(Bergelson and Swingley, 2013), but the question of when
copredicated structures gain their full semantic complexity has
not yet been addressed. Does the concrete sense of book emerge
before the more abstract (and also more commonly used and
accessed) sense? The contingency doctrine does not fare too well
when pitted against books, lunches and cities. Much remains
unexplored, and it is my intention that this brief study will
serve as an entry point into this topic. For instance, while it is
known that proverbial and other forms of figurative knowledge
become more robust in pubescent years (Nippold, 2000), the
developmental trajectory of paired abstract-concrete polysemous
concepts has not been investigated.
With respect to a child’s knowledge of copredication, it seems
that there are only three logically possible developmental stages
that children can exhibit: Knowledge of one polysemous sense
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of the nominal, knowledge of multiple polysemous senses of
the nominal (typically limited to two, but sometimes more in
cases such as newspaper and city), or knowledge of multiple
polysemous senses of the nominal and the interactions these
senses permit (Table 2). For instance, if a child simply understood
both polysemous senses of book but did not explicitly relate
them, they would be unable to understand that two copies of
the same informational book could be taken out of a library by
different people and be defined as identical, with the criterion of
identity relying on the INFORMATION sense at the expense of the
PHYSICAL OBJECT sense. These forms of semantic conflict are at
the heart of copredication, and it was the goal of the present study
to explore their developmental basis.
At this point, a number of possible hypotheses seem possible.
In support of the List Model, we would expect to find no close
correlation between the emergence of any discrete polysemous
senses and the subsequent development of copredication. Under
this hypothesis, these two developmental processes should be
remote. In support of the Generative Model, we would expect
to find not only a close correlation between the emergence of
polysemous senses, but we would also expect the development
of copredication to emerge soon after the acquisition of multiple
senses of a single nominal.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants and Procedure
Using an audio recording device, 24 children aged 4–11 (12 male)
answered a series of questions exploring the definitions of
certain concrete, abstract and complex polysemous words. The
children were at Bishop Martin C.E. Primary School, in Liverpool,
England. In the discussion below, all of the children’s names
have been changed from their real names. The children were
sat with their parent or guardian in a sound-proof room, and
were told to respond to the questions as comprehensively as
possible. The study followed the guidelines in the University of
Nottingham’s Code of Research Conduct and Research Ethics,
such that each child’s parent or guardian signed a consent form.
Interviews lasted on average 8 min (range: 7–10), with the
first few minutes being non-experimental questions to ease the
child into the process and for them to familiarize themselves
with the Question and Answer procedure. This procedure
was sufficient in ensuring that the children (in particular, the
youngest ones) were able to cope as best they could with the
questions, and clear answers were given by all participants
to all experimental questions. The experimental questions put
to the children, discussed below, either asked them to define
a particular word, or to discuss its application in a given
scenario and whether this application was appropriate. The
interviewer had no personal connection with any of the children.
At no point were the children presented with any visual or
auditory stimuli and they were asked to answer the questions
based purely on their intuitive reactions. All subjects gave
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki. The protocol was approved by the School of
English.
Stimuli
In order to take into account the children’s different pragmatic
knowledge due to their age differences, it was ensured that the
questions posed to them were structured in a clear, basic form
requiring no additional knowledge beyond what was contained
within the sentence in order to answer it sufficiently. An example
question posed to the children was ‘What is a river?’ with a
follow-up question probing the nominal’s polysemous senses
being ‘What if the river froze over and cars started driving on
it?’. The children were given as much time as they needed to
answer the question, and no further prompting was given to
them which might prime one or another sense of the nominal
(or indeed any possible relation between senses). Since overt
productions were solely relied upon, it is only possible to make
positive inferences from the data. The children were asked 8
core questions concerning the nominals, with some additional
ones being added to explore the different polysemous senses. The
children’s answers were clear with respect to which sense of the
polysemous nominals they were referring to, such they could not
simulatensouly be referring to both abstract and concrete senses
of book if they defined it as ‘green and big.’ Questions were only
repeated if the child requested them to be. Responses to the same
questions were also recorded from 12 adult controls (7 female,
age range: 24–55), who bore no personal relation to the children
and who also signed the appropriate ethics form. What follows
are reports of some of the responses given by a selection of the
children (see the Supplementary Material for full experimental
transcripts selected from 5 of the 24 participants).
RESULTS
The responses were analyzed based on the number of senses
each child demonstrated an understanding of, as reported in
Tables 1, 2, permitting the recording of a clear developmental
trajectory for each polysemous nominal. No effects of gender
were revealed by a one-way analysis of variance, and so the
TABLE 1 | Means and standard deviations for the 8 nominals investigated.









The means are based on the extent to which the children exhibited an
understanding of copredication, with ‘1’ indicating 1 sense, ‘2’ indicating 2 senses,
and ‘3’ indicating an understanding of possible relations between these two
senses, with the range of understanding being from 0 (exhibiting no understanding
of any sense) to 3 (copredication). For instance, all of the children understood
that the abstract and concrete senses of river can relate, whereas few of them
expressed an understanding of the multiple senses of water and their possible
relations.
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TABLE 2 | Coding the responses of the 24 children.
Participant River Word Person City Book Water House Ship
Samantha (4;8) A + C C A, C A + C A, C A A C
Holly (4;5) A + C C A A, C C A A C
Rosie (4;5) A + C C A A C A A C
Sam (5;8) A + C C A A A A A C
George (5;11) A + C C A + C C A, C A A C
Jennifer (5;4) A + C C A, C A, C A, C A A C
Michael (6;8) A + C C A, C A C A A C
Imran (6;6) A + C C A, C A A A A C
Jane (6;2) A + C C A, C A, C A A A C
Poppy (7;4) A + C C A, C A + C A, C A A A, C
Kate (7;2) A + C C A, C A + C A, C A A, C A, C
Rachael (7;7) A + C C A, C A + C A A A, C C
Ben (8;4) A + C A, C A, C A + C C A A A, C
James (8;7) A + C C A, C A + C A A A, C A, C
Sally (8;1) A + C A, C A, C A + C A A C A, C
Andrew (9;7) A + C A, C A, C A + C A, C A A, C A, C
Greg (9;9) A + C A, C A, C A, C C A A, C A, C
Kylie (9;4) A + C A, C A, C A + C A A A A
Libby (10;7) A + C A + C A + C A + C A + C A, C C A + C
Tom (10;5) A + C A A + C A + C A + C A A A, C
Darren (10;7) A + C A + C A + C A + C A + C A A A, C
Lily (11;4) A + C A + C A + C A + C A + C A, C A + C A + C
Paul (11;6) A + C A + C A + C A + C A + C A, C A A + C
Adam (11;5) A + C A + C A + C A + C A + C A A + C A + C
Each child’s age is indicated to the right of their name in standard (Year;Month) format. ‘A’ and ‘C’ refer to the Abstract and Concrete senses of each polysemous
nominal in the top row. If the child exhibited understanding of only one of the senses, this is denoted with ‘A’ or ‘C.’ If they exhibited understanding of both senses, this is
denoted with ‘A, C.’ Finally, if they exhibited understanding of possible relations between these senses, this is denoted with ‘A + C.’ The black ‘A + C’ denotes the first
developmental occurrence of the copredication.
results were collapsed over this variable. The dependent variable
was the range of senses the children discuss in their definition
of copredication. As Table 2 demonstrates, the children only
began to discuss both abstract and concrete senses for all
nominals at around age 7. There was also a gradual age-based
increase in the number of senses each child demonstrated an
understanding of for each nominal. A Kruskal–Wallis H test
showed that there was a statistically significant difference in
these sense comprehension scores between the different ages,
crossing Age (4–11) with Sense Number (1 sense, 2 senses, or an
interaction between the senses, coded as 3) across each nominal:
χ2(7)= 20.296, p= 0.005. In addition, five of the eight nominals
displayed significantly different rates of sense production across
the eight age groups (from 4 to 11) (p-values are corrected for
multiple comparisons): ship [χ2(7) = 19.190, p = 0.008], book
[χ2(7) = 17.889, p = 0.012], city [χ2(7) = 17.907, p = 0.012],
person [χ2(7) = 17.090, p = 0.017], and word [χ2(7) = 17.895,
p = 0.012]. Since an understanding copredication for river was
exhibited by every child, no significant differences were found.
The combination of senses the children produced for water was
not chronologically variable enough or of sufficiently increased
complexity to yield a significant difference [χ2(7) = 11.317,
p = 0.125]. Finally, although the children began to produce
an understanding of copredication in house at age 11, the
progression from single sense to multiple sense understanding
and onto copredication was not chronologically varied enough
to yield significance [χ2(7) = 10.984, p = 0.139]; compare the
development of house with ship in Table 2.
These results will be discussed based on the type of
polysemous nominal discussed. The development of word
meaning and metalinguistic awareness of participants can be
aptly characterized by certain stages. I will here primarily discuss
the responses of five children of particular interest, mainly
because they are representative of their age group but also because
each of these children were developmentally the first to exhibit
understanding of at least one of the copredications examined
(Table 2). In the current sample, when asked ‘What is a word?’ the
responses of the youngest participant, Samantha (4), demonstrate
little metalinguistic awareness like the rest of her cohort, defining
a word simply as ‘A sound.’ She consequently associates her
favorite word with her favorite referent or concept (‘Love’), being
unable to consider and evaluate the phonetic features of words
(defined as ‘C’ in Table 2, for Concrete sense only). George
(5) also provides a purely functional definition of word (‘It’s
like a cat’), unlike the older Kate (7), who identifies words as
being inside dictionaries. Kate, with her developed metalinguistic
competence, also recognizes blah blah as ‘not a real word.’ She
does, at the same time, say her favorite word is ‘red,’ ‘Because I
like the color’; a somewhat less developed response than Libby
(10), who justifies her favorite word (‘Love’) by citing its multiple
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meanings (platonic, romantic, etc.). Samantha (4) views words as
strictly iconic, responding to the question ‘What would happen
if we started calling a radiator a toothbrush?’ with ‘You’d be
using a radiator for a toothbrush,’ believing the word radiator
is an inherent feature of the object itself. She does, however,
understand the subordinate category fruit – knowledge revealed
by her use of the final pronoun in her definition of the concept as
‘It’s juice and you can eat them.’
Overextensions in categories were not encountered in the
current sample, corroborating much research into the rarity
of such occurrences (Rescorla, 1980). A typically functional
definition of the basic level word ‘water’ is also given by Samantha
(4) (‘Something that you can drink’), with only Libby (10)
being able to situate it into a superordinate category liquid.
Samantha’s linguistic development appears fairly representative
of the iconic stage, though her articulatory skills are perhaps
more advanced. The older Libby, being at the transitional stage
of semantic development, recognizes that calling a radiator a
toothbrush would be ‘silly really, because if you use a radiator
as a toothbrush. . . it’d be weird because it’s not a brush and
it’s not for your teeth,’ understanding the absurdity of swapping
two concrete identities (she acknowledges that the definition
of an object is largely based on ‘what you use it for’), though
still viewing words as iconic signifiers. Lily (11) seems to have
outgrown this tendency, replying that ‘People would think it’s
something else until people got used to it.’
Samantha’s (4) handling of simultaneously concrete and
abstract features places her more in the functional/perceptual
stage than the first stage, since she recognizes that the definition of
a river is based more on intentional considerations than material
constituency, agreeing with every other participant that a river
would still be the same river if its flow were to be reversed,
though also recognizing that if the river froze over and cars
started driving on it, ‘It would be a road,’ exhibiting a competence
understanding of the range of available copredications with
respect to river (termed ‘A + C’ in Table 2). The definition of
a river or tree resides in ‘a Sympathy of Parts’ directed to ‘one
common End,’ the Earl of Shaftesbury Ashley-Cooper (1711/2001:
349–350) argued, stressing the importance of human interests
and concerns also noted by Kate (7) (‘It’s like where people can
go fishing, and made of water’), but not George (5).
Adding also to Hobbes’s (1659/2010) investigations into the
meaning of river, we might add that the flow of a river can
be reversed and diverted, divided into subsequently converging
streams, and changed in innumerable ways and yet remain the
same thing – something that Lily (11) is quick to point out, along
with Libby (10), since ‘it wouldn’t be rebuilt with concrete.’ She is
also the only participant to know about H2O, arguing that water is
‘just a different name’ for it, since to her they are identical. Folk-
scientific concepts (water) and various assemblies of molecules
(H2O) yield separate concepts with different properties, though
children (and many adults) are innate ‘externalists,’ believing that
the meaning of, for instance, water, is determined by the physical
properties of the thing is can be used to refer to (recall that
Helen Keller learnt the meaning of water, not H2O), not realizing
that a thing is just as obscure a notion as a sound or word. The
sheer prominence of externalist intuitions such as ‘water=H2O’
seems to run counter to Clark’s principle of contrast, which
stipulates (correctly though controversially) that different words
have different meanings (Clark, 1993).
Moving to another form of copredication, Samantha (4) seems
to know what a house is, though she struggles in understanding
what it would mean to ‘paint’ it (a highly intricate word meaning
something like ‘intentionally covering a surface with paint’),
possibly because learning nouns relies less on context than
learning verbs, with the latter requiring a complex understanding
of intentional motion, geometric structure, causality, temporality,
and more abstract notions (Tomasello and Barton, 1994) which
often require particular physical contexts to grasp properly. This
is also likely due to the noun-rich nature of early language
acquisition (Nelson, 1973). She has, however, clearly moved
beyond context-bound word use, discussing her decontextualised
semantic knowledge of houses when there are none in sight
(Barrett, 1995). All of the participants also demonstrated an
understanding that painting a house brown would result in
the exterior surface being painted (confirming the intuition in
Chomsky, 2000, which claims this to be the case, in contrast to
Mukherji, 2010), since a designated exterior is imposed on the
object by its semantic features in terms of intended design. The
children were also given the following scenario (Supplementary
Material): ‘If I put lots of books in my house and invited
people to take the books, could it be a library?’. Only the
oldest children – Lily (11) and Adam (11) – produced abstract,
functionalist responses to this question, agreeing that the same
physical building could assume a distinct identity pending human
interests and concerns, with the younger children’s conception of
house being primarily based on physical features.
Before the interview, the children were asked if they had any
siblings; if so, they this additional question concerning swapping
their sibling’s name was added to further explore the child’s
understanding of personhood. The word sister was understood
by the younger participants to be inherently associated with a
referent, with Samantha (4) believing that if she and her sister
swapped names ‘I would be 9 because my sister’s 9, and she would
be 6.’ George (5) and the older children believe that trading names
does not result in trading identities (‘She would call me a different
name’). Locke, it seems, was right in arguing that ‘[person] is
a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit; and so
belongs to intelligent agents, capable of a law, and happiness, and
misery’ (Locke, 1689/1836: 234). When presented with the fairy
tale of a prince who turns into a frog before being turned back,
Samantha (4) mixes the concrete identity of the frog’s body with
the personal identity of the prince’s self: ‘He’s a prince-frog, and
when the girl kisses the prince he turns back.’ The slightly older
George (5), however, argues that ‘No, he’s a frog,’ demonstrating
a less refined concept of personhood, though clearly an existing
one, with the use of ‘he’ presupposing an understanding of self ;
what Strawson (2009) believes to be the most complex human
concept. The three older children argue affirmatively, with Libby
(10) agreeing with Locke that the core feature of personhood is
‘personality’ and consciousness.
When asked whether Liverpool would still be ‘Liverpool’ if
it were rebuilt on the other side of the country, again George
(5) says ‘No.’ His grasp of the abstract features of cities appears
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to develop later than his classmates, with only Libby (10)
agreeing with him, but not for the same reasons, since she
questions Liverpool’s changing identity not because she disagrees
with the arbitrariness principle, but because she thinks deeper
into the social ramifications of moving a city. George (5) also
gives a functional/perceptual definition of book, and (perhaps
surprisingly) believes that if he and his sister were to take two
copies of the Bible out of the library they would be taking out the
same book, with his understanding of the abstractness of concrete
objects being more developed than his concepts of personal
identity. The opposite seems to be the case with Libby (10),
whose exhibits an understanding of the concrete features of book,
but not its abstract (INFORMATION) features. Lily (11), however,
believes the same book is taken out, stressing the importance of
authorial – and hence personal – intention (‘Same stories written
by the same people’). When questioned about the different forms
the information may take, she answers ‘It’s still a book. You can
download it on your laptop.’ This struggle between personal and
physicalist concerns echoes in the definition of ship, and whether
a ship owned by an individual’s father remains identical according
to a particular sense even when its original material constituency
is altered and the old parts are constructed to make a second ship.
Kate (7) believes ‘The new one’ to be her father’s ship, ‘because it
would be much cleaner.’ Libby’s (10) understanding of the ship’s
identity is subordinate to the identity of the ship’s parts, owned by
her father (‘because it’s your parts’), while Libby’s (10) concern for
ownership goes beyond this, believing both would be her father’s
ships ‘because that’s what the definition of “yours” is.’
The responses of the 12 adult controls were fairly similar to
that of the older children, giving functional definitions of book
and river while also intuitively equating folk-scientific concepts
(water) with physical entities (H2O). The semantic development
of the 10- to 11-years-old was correspondingly adult-like, with
only the younger 4- to 5-years-old struggling to categorize
concrete objects. The adults also used more nominals than the
children. But according to the present sample, Liverpool is still
deemed Liverpool even after it has been assigned a different
spatiotemporal location by all children aged 10 and above. All
adults displayed an understanding of copredication in all of
the nominals, with the exception of water, whose ‘impossible’
structure (from the perspective of folk physics) was never grasped
by any of the participants. Every participant scored ‘2’ for
water, understanding its multiple senses but never grasping their
possible relations. Across all the other nominals, each adult
scored ‘3’.
DISCUSSION
As Table 2 indicates, only the ages of 4–5 and 10–11 involve the
introduction of new copredications into the children’s answers
out of the eight nominals investigated. The period between
aged 5 and 10 seems to involve the acquisition of multiple
polysemous senses with respect to word, house, book and ship,
and it is not until aged 10 and onward that the semantic
relations between these senses can be properly understood –
and in the case of water, the children (and indeed the adult
controls) never developed this level of understanding. Given
the types of nominals which fit into each of the two central
stages (4–5 and 10–11), we can draw some potential theoretical
conclusions. Although it might initially appear paradoxical, it
seems that the more complex nominals involving the highest
number of semantically complex polysemous senses (person
and city) permit copredication years in advance of nominals
with only two polysemous senses (word, house, book and ship).
A city can be an institution, a location, a collection of physical
buildings, or a government/polity, while a person can be a
conscious self, a physical body, or metonymically representative
of some body of work. In contrast, the other nominals can only
host two senses (e.g., book is composed of INFORMATION and
PHYSICAL OBJECT senses). It may be that because the more
complex nominals have a greater number of senses there is
consequently a greater statistical likelihood of any child acquiring
(and indeed relating via copredication) at least two of these
senses, whereas in the case of less complex nominals like ship
or word the child has to develop a full understanding of the
nominal before copredication can be licensed. Finally, with
respect to the question of polysemous sense representation,
the present results can be argued to support the Generative
Model (or One Representation Hypothesis), with the idea that
distinct polysemous senses share a common representational base
seemingly being supported by the finding that understanding of
copredication emerges soon after understanding of the discrete
polysemous senses does, such that the common representation
can be used to support an understanding of the possible semantic
relations between different senses. The only notable exception
to this trend is book, with the relatively large gap between
acquisition of both senses and acquisition of copredication for
this nominal likely being explained by the fact that the particular
copredication investigated in the present study involved complex
numeric quantification operating discretely over one but not both
senses, recruiting certain non-lexical mathematical processes to
compute the copredication.
My interpretation of this brief survey is that it suggests
that knowledge of polysemous semantic features has clear
developmental stages, with basic forms of copredication
emerging at the point of production (though not necessarily
comprehension) around the age of 4, but other, more complex
forms not emerging until around age 10. Even when prompted
to think about the distinct senses of complex polysemous words
like book and river and consider possible relations between
them, children below the age of 10 exhibited no ability to
comprehend any possible interactions between semantically
distinct yet lexically related senses. With these brief assumptions,
we find that a child’s innate semantic knowledge provides rich
perspectives through which the environment world may be
interpreted.
It was discussed above how the development of word
meanings appears to rely on non-linguistic conceptual structures.
Yet, this is not to say that certain cognitive primitives responsible
for complex polysemy (e.g., the discrete polysemous abstract and
concrete senses which generate the meaning of book) simply
appear as a result of maturational processes and do not require
experience in order to be developed. It may well be that certain
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nominals require broader forms of perceptual experience in order
for the relations between senses to be developed and matured.
For instance, due to the close physical relation between the two
senses of river, it is likely that complex polysemy is acquired
much earlier for this nominal than it would be for nominals
which permit sense relations which exhibit much more physically
distant connections, as in newspaper (where the institution is
contrasted with the printed paper).
The environment doubtless has some effect in determining
word meaning (indeed, material constitution may be a more
determining factor for river than for book), but the nature
of a child’s lexicon also appears to develop based on quite
independent factors (Goodman et al., 1998; McMurray et al.,
2012). For instance, McMurray et al. (2012) propose that
a dynamic associative model for word referent learning in
which denotational selection is simulated as a competition
between competing referents, accounting for a number of
independent findings about delays in expressive compared to
receptive vocabulary and word acquisition during high levels of
referential ambiguity. This may in turn account for the delays
in copredication licensing documented here, since by their very
nature copredications often involve unusually disparate referents
crossing core conceptual categories, where newspaper can denote
an institution which can be sued or a webpage with textual
information. The nature of these delays in turn suggests that
these forms of dynamic associative models require development,
through which the robustness of a child’s associative model can
manage an enlarged lexicon.
If these assumptions are along the right track, a suitable
follow-up experiment would be to submit a similar group of
children to a course of semantic training such that they are
exposed to a range of polysemous nominals exhibiting both
abstract and concrete senses. In particular, training would involve
presenting children with a range of simple, easily comprehendible
example scenarios demonstrating various possible copredications
as a means of exposing them to the numerous roles distinct
polysemous senses can play in delimiting the identity of certain
objects. It could also be tested whether exposing children to one
sense of a complex polysemous nominal (e.g., the INSTITUTION
sense of newspaper over its INFORMATION sense) strengthened
their understanding of subsequent copredications more than
another sense. If there is a close match between the performance
scores documented here and semantic competence, we would
expect that this training would have little impact on performance
with respect to the possibility of comprehending particular
copredications. However, it could also be the case that the
time which children take to grasp a particular copredication is
modulated by the discrete sense(s) they are exposed to, such
that, for instance, they are quicker to develop an understanding
of newspaper copredications if exposed more to INSTITUTION-
based scenarios than INFORMATION- or PHYSICAL OBJECT-
based ones. Indeed, there may well be a correlation between
the type of sense emphasized during training (e.g., an abstract
sense) and the rate of acquisition and depth of understanding
exhibited as a result. This topic will have to be left to future
research.
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